Boeing makes money three ways. Its Commercial Airplanes division builds and sells jets — the 737, 767, 777, and 787 — to airlines around the world. Its Defense, Space & Security division builds military aircraft, missiles, satellites, and space systems, mostly for the U.S. government. Its Global Services division sells spare parts, repairs, training, and maintenance to both airlines and military customers. Each delivery of an airplane triggers a payment. Each service contract generates recurring fees. The three divisions together produced $89.5 billion in revenue in 2025. The diagram below traces where the money goes.
Five years of financial data tell a story of a company that has been through serious damage and is trying to climb back. Revenue fell from $66.3 billion in 2021 to a low of $66.5 billion in 2024 — almost no growth over four years — before jumping sharply to $89.5 billion in 2025. But revenue alone does not tell the full story. The real picture is in the cash and the losses underneath.
In 2021, Boeing burned through $4.4 billion more cash than it generated — it was spending far more than it was taking in. By 2023 it had turned that around, generating $4.4 billion in free cash flow. Then 2024 hit hard. A door plug blew out of a 737-9 mid-flight in January 2024. The FAA launched an investigation and forced Boeing to slow production. A 53-day strike by 30,000 machinists halted almost all commercial aircraft assembly. Boeing burned $14.3 billion in cash that year — its worst cash performance in the five-year window. The net loss for 2024 reached $11.8 billion.
In 2025, revenue bounced back strongly — partly because deliveries recovered, and partly because Boeing completed two big transactions. It sold its Digital Aviation Solutions business for $10.55 billion in cash. It also acquired Spirit AeroSystems, the supplier that makes fuselages for the 737, 767, 777, and 787, by exchanging roughly $4.7 billion in Boeing shares. These moves reshaped the balance sheet and the revenue line at the same time. But even with $89.5 billion in revenue, free cash flow was still negative at $1.9 billion, and net debt rose to $43.2 billion.
The gross margin numbers show how deep the production problems ran. In 2023, gross margin was nearly 10% — Boeing was covering its direct costs and then some. In 2024, gross margin turned negative, dropping to roughly minus 3%. Boeing was spending more to build and deliver airplanes than customers were paying for them. In 2025, gross margin recovered to around 5%, but that is still well below the 2023 level. The Commercial Airplanes division lost $7.1 billion from operations in 2025 — a division that is supposed to be the heart of the business.
The division that actually made money in 2025 was Global Services, which recorded $13.5 billion in operating earnings. But a large portion of that came from the one-time sale of the Digital Aviation Solutions business — not from recurring services revenue. Strip that out and the underlying profit picture looks much thinner.
Now consider the risks documented in Boeing's own filings. They are specific and serious. The 777X, Boeing's next-generation wide-body jet, has accumulated $4.9 billion in losses in 2025 alone. It is still in certification flight testing — the third phase only began in November 2025. First delivery has been delayed again. The 737-7 and 737-10 variants are also still awaiting FAA certification, expected in 2026. Until those certifications arrive, Boeing cannot deliver those aircraft and cannot book the revenue they represent.
The backlog of $682 billion sounds reassuring — it means airlines want Boeing's planes. But backlog is only valuable if Boeing can actually deliver. The 737 line was running at 42 aircraft per month at the end of 2025, with plans to reach 47 in 2026 — but only with FAA approval. Any further quality incident, strike, or supply chain breakdown could push that back. About 40% of Boeing's workforce — 72,000 people — are covered by union contracts. The machinists' contract in Washington state does not expire until September 2028, but the engineers' contracts at SPEEA come up in October 2026.
The Defense division recorded $5.0 billion in additional losses in 2024 on fixed-price development programs — programs like the T-7A Red Hawk trainer, the KC-46A Tanker, and the MQ-25 drone. In 2025, a 101-day strike at St. Louis disrupted the F/A-18, F-15, T-7A, and MQ-25 programs. The division is stabilizing but still losing money from operations. Meanwhile, about 35% of total Boeing revenue comes from U.S. government contracts — meaning federal budget decisions, government shutdowns, and congressional delays directly affect Boeing's cash flow. A partial government shutdown was already underway at the start of 2026.
Net debt stood at $43.2 billion at the end of 2025. Boeing paid $2.8 billion in interest expense that year. With free cash flow still negative, the company is not yet generating enough cash to pay down that debt — it is borrowing to survive while it tries to rebuild its production machine. The path back to financial health runs entirely through the ability to build and deliver more airplanes, at higher margins, without another production crisis or labor stoppage.